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Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny
*Elliott L. Meyrowitz
In Foreign Affairs and The Constitution,' Professor Louis Henkin
pointed out that one of the important traditional functions of the Con-
stitution, albeit many times overlooked and ignored, has been to limit
the actions of our government in the area of foreign relations. The orig-
inal conception of democratic life rested primarily on the idea that re-
straints must be placed upon governmental leaders. The founders of the
Republic wanted to prevent the evils of absolute power in foreign af-
fairs. In fact, as Professor Henkin also pointed out,2 how the Constitu-
tion should govern the conduct of foreign affairs was a prominent con-
cern during the deliberations of the constitutional convention.
Eventually, Congress was entrusted with the responsibility to declare
war, and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, was expected to carry
out foreign policy within a framework of law.
Notwithstanding the intent of the framers of the Constitution,
courts in the United States have been extremely reluctant to examine
questions touching on foreign policy, concluding that such issues are
nonjusticiable because the subject matter of foreign relations is en-
trusted to the discretion of the executive branch of government. In the
background of this judicial thinking lurks the notion that the sovereign
has unfettered discretion in the area of foreign relations. Ironically,
those very same courts continue to uphold the idea that restraint in the
domestic sphere is necessary if the courts are to guard society from
abuse by the state.
There is no issue more central to the conduct of United States
foreign policy than the strategies associated with the threat of use or
the actual use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, for thirty-seven years,
* Elliott L. Meyrowitz is an attorney and an adjunct Professor of Law at The
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University and vice chairperson of the
lawyers' committee on Nuclear Policy.
1. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
2. Id. at vii.
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American legal institutions have been either indifferent to the impact
of the nuclear weapons structure on democratic governance or believed
that the Constitution has little, if any, role to play in areas of "high
policy" such as national security. If there has been any discussion on
this subject at all, it is generally claimed by the legal community and
policy-makers alike, that the existence of nuclear weapons under the
doctrine of deterrence is the bulwark of American freedom, which in
turn only adds to the enormous responsibilities of the President in the
area of foreign policy.
In his article, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law,3 Profes-
sor Miller has broken this profound and dangerous silence. By pointing
out the serious defects in our governing process caused by our nuclear
weapons policy, he refuses to accept the notion that the Constitution is
irrelevant to questions of momentous historic importance. His argu-
ments are built upon the idea that if the Constitution was relevant to
the formation of our government, it is equally relevant to policies which
could destroy the nation. Hence, implicit in Professor Miller's analysis
is a well justified belief that the issue of nuclear weapons is of far too
great an importance to be the preserve solely of government leaders,
foreign policy experts or military professionals. Citizens in general, and
the legal community in particular, must be involved in deciding the
momentous question of whether there are any rational or moral
grounds for using nuclear weapons. The publication of Professor
Miller's analysis is particularly gratifying because the inclusion of a
legal analysis in answering this question will help create an atmosphere
affirming the relevance of democratic standards and processes to the
issue of national security and the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
In this regard, Professor Miller's lucid presentation and probing
analysis is premised upon an important historic fact - that the most
fundamental challenges to established governmental policies have de-
pended upon prior expressions of citizen concern. Traditionally, a legal
analysis has been relevant to the scale and grounds of such concern.
Certainly, it should not be forgotten that in areas basic to democracy,
civil liberties and civil rights, a sense of constitutional entitlement un-
derlay and inspired the recourse to citizen activism which in turn sub-
sequently produced an altered climate enabling adjustments in public
3. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
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policy and laws.
At this juncture in my comment, I would like to focus and expand
upon two especially significant points made by Professor Miller that
concern how nuclear weapons challenge our governing process: 1.) the
abuse of state power; and 2.) the applicability of international law. For
this author, the development, possession, and deployment of nuclear
weapons and the government's willingness and readiness to use them
has severely undercut some of the most basic traditions and structures
of democratic society. This conclusion is derived from two mutually
reinforcing circumstances.
The first of these circumstances concerns assumptions of absolute
authority by our governmental leaders over the well-being of the citi-
zenry without sufficient accountability in the area of national security.
The authority of the President in the area of nuclear weapons policy
gives that office unrestrained power over human destiny- without an
equivalent in human history - that is, the power to cause a global
human apocalypse. Certainly, even the most despotic tyrant claiming to
rule by divine right never wielded such power.
To say the least, the absolute nature of the power of the President
in this area makes a mockery of our democratic standards and
processes. Given the democratic traditions of this nation, it would be
difficult to imagine a reasonably prudent citizen assenting to the grant
of such awesome power to one person or one branch of government
when the exercise of that power could spell unparalleled human death
and destruction.
Furthermore, the very nature of nuclear weapons forces us to live
constantly on the edge of war. Nuclear weapons technology is such that
human extinction is only a few minutes away. This technology and the
nuclear weapons policies that have evolved since 1945 compel our soci-
ety to live in a permanent pre-war atmosphere, a permanent state of
military mobilization to wage a nuclear conflict. It has been the con-
ventional wisdom that the President as Commander-in-Chief only exer-
cised his emergency battlefield decision-making power during wartime.
Now, the President exercises power in "peacetime" that he could only
exercise during a war. Consequently, the nuclear national security
structure that has emerged over the past thirty-seven years has had the
effect of erasing the distinction between the peacetime and wartime
powers of the President which are so fundamental to the operation of
democratic processes.
95
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Whether the nuclear national security system constructed around
deterrence gives rise to a nuclear war or not, that system has also
caused the rise of a society based on secrecy and surveillance. To ap-
preciate the incompatability of the government's nuclear weapons poli-
cies with the idea of a democratic society, one need only look at the
political repression and hysteria associated with the espionage issue of
the 1950's. One justification offered at that time by the government for
this repression was to prevent the "secret" of the atomic bomb from
falling into the hands of a hostile foreign power. How absurd this justi-
fication now appears in light of the atomic bomb that was designed as a
classroom exercise by a college student using publicly obtainable docu-
ments. Even still the government persists in withholding information
with which citizens could rationally evaluate the effects and conse-
quences of our nuclear weapons policies as well as engaging in secret
surveillance of lawful political activities by the citizenry. The effective-
ness of this repression can be evaluated by simply inquiring of the
American public whether they are aware of the numerous occasions
since 1945 when our foreign policy decision-makers seriously contem-
plated the threat of use or the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
situation.
The other circumstance which was touched upon briefly by Profes-
sor Miller, in arguing that democratic society is being seriously dam-
aged by nuclear weapons, is that nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled
with the basic principles of international law.
The prevalent belief among the general public as well as policy-
makers is that nuclear weapons are legal under international law. The
official position of the United States as found in its military manuals is
the blanket assertion that a state may do whatever it is not expressly
forbidden from doing. Therefore, the United States government argues
that since international law has not generated a duly ratified treaty,
there is no foundation for contending that nuclear weapons are illegal
or prohibited.
However, the legality of nuclear weapons cannot be judged solely
by the existence or non-existence of a treaty rule specifically prohibi-
tiong or restricting their use. Any reasonable analysis must take into
consideration all the recognized sources of international law - treaties,
custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and the writing of
qualified publicists. Of particular relevance in evaluating nuclear weap-
ons are the many treaties and conventions which limit the use of weap-
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ons in war; the fundamental distinction between combatant and non-
combatant; and the principles of humanity including the prohibition of
weapons and tactics that are especially cruel and cause unnecessary
suffering. A review of these basic principles supports the conclusion
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons pursuant to either a doctrine
of massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, counterforce, or lim-
ited nuclear war, is illegal under international law.
Restraints on the conduct of hostilities are traditionally not limited
to those given explicit voice in specific treaty stipulations. Aware of the
continuous evolution of war technology, the 1907 Hague Regulations
contain a general yardstick intended exactly for situations where no
specific treaty rule exists to prohibit a new type of weapon or tactic. In
such cases, "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the pro-
tection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience."" Hence, this
general rule, known as the Martens Clause, makes the principles of
humanity and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by them-
selves, without the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting a
new weapon.
Ever since the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868,1 the princi-
ples of humanity have been asserted as a legal constraint upon military
necessity. The Declaration embodies the twin ground rules of the laws
of war: that "the right to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited"6 and that "the only legitimate object which states should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of
the enemy. ' '1
Another basic source of the laws of war is the Hague Conventions
4. 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309 (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
For a wider discussion of the Martens Clause see Fried, The Electronic Battlefield and
the Dictates of the Public Conscience, REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 431-
54 (Feb. 1972).
5. Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectices
(1868) which appears in I THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
4, at 192. See also 3 R. PHILLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-62 (3d ed. 1885); 1
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 95 (1907).
6. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4.
7. Id.
971
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of 1907,8 particularly the Regulations embodied in Hague Convention
IV. These Regulations are recognized as "the foundation stones of
modern law of armed conflict." 9 A fundamental tenet of these Regula-
tions is the prohibition of weapons and tactics which cause wanton or
indiscriminate destruction.
It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons in populated areas
would result in the indiscriminate and massive slaughter of civilians.
Moreover, even if nuclear weapons were used only against an enemy's
strategic nuclear forces, the annihilation and extermination of the civil-
ian population would be an inevitable by-product. As the experiences of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki amply demonstrate, the effects of nuclear
weapons because of their very awesome nature, cannot be limited to
military targets. Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons would result
in the commission of war crimes on an enormous scale.
The effect of radioactive fallout can also be considered the func-
tional equivalent of the effects of the use of poison gas or bacteriologi-
cal weapon. The Hague Declaration (IV, 2) concerning Asphyxiating
Gases of 189910 prohibits projectiles whose sole purpose is the diffusion
of asphyxiating gases and the Geneva Gas Protocol of 192511 prohibits
the use of both poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. A strong
case can be made that human exposure to radiation or radioactive fall-
out brings nuclear weapons within the ambit of these international con-
ventions. While it is true that nuclear weapons do not produce the bac-
teria, fungi or living organisms normally associated with bacteriological
weapons, it is indisputable that nuclear weapons do alter the chemical
structure of humans, plants and animals, as well as producing long-
8. Convention (IV) Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened
for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT 57-92 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds. 1973). See also 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
9. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET No. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL
LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS ch. 1, at 1 & ch.
5, at I (Washington, D.C. 1976).
10. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (1899) in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 99-101. See also 1 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 129, 155 (1907).
11. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 109-20. (1925) See also, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061,
94 L.N.S.T. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49 (1975).
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term genetic effects.
Certainly, both bacteriological and nuclear weapons are poten-
tially weapons of mass destruction with an unprecedented capability to
destroy the physical integrity of the planet and to threaten our exis-
tence as a species. If the conscience of the international legal communi-
ty finds the scale of potential effects produced by the use of bacterio-
logical weapons inherently objectionable, then it necessarily follows
that the prohibition of their use should be extended to nuclear weapons.
In view of the similar potential of each type of weapon for far-reaching
destruction, it would be difficult to grasp the legal or moral basis for
condemning one, but tolerating the other.
Flowing logically from the requirement that weapons must be used
selectively and only against military targets, is the commitment to pro-
tect civilians and the elementary distinction between combatants and
non-combatants. The principle that civilian populations can never be
regarded as military objects is, in fact, "at the very heart of the laws of
war."' 2 Without the element of discrimination between military and
non-military targets, the fundamental distinction between combatants
and non-combatants becomes meaningless. Today, the use of nuclear
weapons pursuant to either the doctrines of mutual assured destruction,
counterforce, or limited nuclear war would result in the indiscriminate
and massive slaughter of civilian populations. To recognize the legality
of nuclear weapons, given their capacity to terrorize and destroy a civil-
ian population, would be to eliminate virtually the entire thrust and
significance of the laws of war.
The universally accepted Geneva Conventions of 1949 reaffirm the
distinction between combatant and non-combatant. In particular,
"Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War"13 imposes additional detailed obligations on all belligerents to
ensure the essential requirements for the health, safety and sustenance
of the civilian population. Given the evidence developed by doctors and
12. R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program,
Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)). For a further discussion
of this point see VI The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, 153 (Yale ed. 1944).
13. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (1949), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 417-512. See also 6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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scientists as to the medical and environmental consequences of nuclear
weapons, it is clear that it would be impossible under conditions of nu-
clear war to carry out the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, just
as it would also be impossible to live up to the dictates of the Hague
Conventions - both of which aim at preserving the minimum require-
ments for the continued survivability and viability of all societies in-
volved in armed conflict.
Complementing the distinction between combatants and noncom-
batants is the equally important principle that the international de-
struction of a group of people because of their race, religion or nation-
ality constitutes a crime under international law. This legal innovation,
which is embodied in the Nuremberg Principles14 and underlies the Ge-
nocide Convention of 1948,15 further extended the "principles of hu-
manity" which had earlier been used to determine the legality or ille-
gality of specific weapons.
The deaths resulting from an all-out nuclear exchange between the
United States and the Soviet Union are estimated, conservatively, at
more then 300 million people. Obviously, the indiscriminate human
slaughter resulting from a major nuclear war would dwarf even the
awesome genocidal policies enacted by the Nazi government during
World War II. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and
their known radioactive effects, any large-scale use of nuclear weapons
would produce consequences clearly contrary to the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Nuremberg Principles and the Genocide Convention.
On the basis of these unquestioned principles of international law
enumerated above, the United Nations has offered a legal interpreta-
tion of the status of nuclear weapons. In 1961, the General Assembly
declared in Resolution 1653(XVI) that "any state using nuclear or
thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of
the United Nations, as acting contrary to the law of humanity, and as
14. For the text of Principle VI of the Nuremberg Principles which makes pun-
ishable as an international crime "crimes against humanity," see THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 701-02. See also Report of International Law Commission,
2nd Sess. 5 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 12) at iii-22, U.N. Doe. A/13/16 (1950).
15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 163-178. See also, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
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committing a crime against mankind and civilization."16 That Resolu-
tion was reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions in 1978 and 1980.17 As
evidenced by these actions of the General Assembly, a consensus has
been clearly emerging that the use of nuclear weapons contradicts the
fundamental humanitarian principles upon which the international law
of war is founded.
Despite the clarity of the fundamental precepts of international
law regarding nuclear weapons, there is an influential school of thought
claiming that in an era of "total war" even the most fundamental rules
can be disregarded in the name of military necessity. Ironically, this
view of international law was urged in another context by some of the
Nuremberg defendants and indignantly rejected by the International
Tribunal." The Tribunal's judgment warns that this "Nazi conception"
of total war would destroy the validity of international law altogether.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of such a view would exculpate Auschwitz.
Military necessity cannot be allowed to justify barbarism.
Even though the laws of war were violated on numerous occasions
during World War II by even the Allies, this is not sufficient reason to
abandon the laws of war. Rather than ignoring the content of interna-
tional law, the American legal community needs to restore respect for
the limits on state sovereignty set by the laws of war, not validate past
disrespect and criminality by cynical claims to the irrelevancy of inter-
national law. To that end, it is practical, not idealistic, to take interna-
tional law seriously. We would be more secure as a people, not less, if
our governmental leaders were to try to conform national policy to the
minimal obligations of international law. To assume the legality of a
weapon with the distinct capability to terrorize and to destroy an entire
civilian population makes meaningless the entire effort to limit combat
through the laws of war. Global "survivability" is so elemental that the
prohibition against nuclear weapons can be reasonably inferred from
the existing laws of war. To conclude differently would be to ignore the
16. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
17. Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res.
33/71-B, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); G.A.
Res. 35/152-0, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
18. For the text of the Final Judgment see, 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 171 (1947).
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barbaric and nefarious character of the use of nuclear weapons. As the
laws of war embody the minimum demands of decency, exempting nu-
clear weapons from regulatory prohibition would be abandoning even
this minimum standard.
In conclusion, we have reached a dramatic stage in our history as
a nation where our foreign policy must be carried out within the re-
straints of constitutional and international law. The demand for an ef-
fective legal structure is not quixotic - it is an absolute requirement of
survival. Accordingly, a legal challenge gives our courts an important
opportunity to "check" the most dangerous of all possible excesses of
government which threatens not only the very foundations of our soci-
ety, but all humanity. Of course, neither legal argument nor legal tac-
tic is alone going to make the significant difference, especially where,
as here, they touch sensitively upon prevailing notions of national se-
curity. However, it should be remembered that constitutional and inter-
national legal principles proved relevant for citizens who sought to
question the legality of American policies in Vietnam. The strength of
these principles as constraints upon the war-making power of the Presi-
dent cannot be measured by the extent of the adherence on the part of
the government alone. The assimilation and acceptance of these con-
straints at the level of conventional legal wisdom may influence the
choice of tactics and policies at official decision-making levels and even-
tually build support for nuclear disarmament initiatives and a less mili-
tarized conception of national security. If we are to protect humanity
from drifting further toward nuclear catastrophe, then we in the legal
community must expose the incompatability of nuclear weapons with
all the values that the Constitution obligates us to preserve. At stake is
a democratic society and, indeed, life itself.
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